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Abstract. Code protection technologies require anti reverse engineering transformations to obfuscate pro-
grams in such a way that tools and methods for program analysis become ineffective. We introduce the
concept of model deformation inducing an effective code obfuscation against attacks performed by abstract
model checking. This means complicating the model in such a way a high number of spurious traces are
generated in any formal verification of the property to disclose about the system under attack. We transform
the program model in order to make the removal of spurious counterexamples by abstraction refinement
maximally inefficient. Because our approach is intended to defeat the fundamental abstraction refinement
strategy, we are independent from the specific attack carried out by abstract model checking. A measure of
the quality of the obfuscation obtained by model deformation is given together with a corresponding best
obfuscation strategy for abstract model checking based on partition refinement.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The scenario
Software systems are a strategic asset, which in addition to correctness deserves security and protection. This
is particularly critical with the increase of mobile devices and ubiquitous computings, where the traditional
black-box security model, with the attacker not able to see into the implementation system, is not adequate
anymore. Code protection technologies are increasing their relevance due to the ubiquitous nature of modern
untrusted environments where code runs. From home networks to consumer devices (e.g., mobile devices, web
browsers, cloud, and IoT devices), the running environment cannot guarantee integrity and privacy. Existing
techniques for software protection originated with the need to protect license-checking code in software,
particularly in games or in IP protection. Sophisticated techniques, such as white-box (WB) cryptography
and software watermarking, were developed to prevent adversaries from circumventing media anti-piracy
protection in Digital Rights Management systems.
A WB attack model to a software system S assumes that the attacker has full access to all of the components
of S, i.e., S can be inspected, analysed, verified, reverse-engineered, or modified. The goal of the attack is
to disclose properties of the run-time behaviour of S. These can be a hidden watermark [31, 24, 11], a
cryptographic key or an invariance property for disclosing program semantics and make correct reverse
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engineering [9]. Note that standard encryption is only partially applicable for protecting S in this scenario:
The transformed code has to be executable while being protected. Protection is therefore implemented
as obfuscation [8]. Essentially, an obfuscation is a compiler that transforms an input program p into a
semantically equivalent one O(p) but harder to analyse and reverse engineer.
In many cases it is enough to guarantee that the attacker cannot disclose the information within a bounded
amount of time and with limited resources available. This is the case if new releases of the program are
issued frequently or if the information to be disclosed is some secret key whose validity is limited in time,
e.g., when used in pay-per-view mobile entertainment and in streaming of live events. Here the goal of the
code obfuscation is to prevent the attacker from disclosing some keys before the end of the event.
Impossibility results of virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation [2], proves that there exists a fundamental
difference between having black-box access to a function and having a WB access to a program that computes
it, no matter how obfuscated: The program provides an intensional representation of the function, always
disclosing information about its implementation, allowing reverse-engineering of code. Similarly to Rice’s
impossibility theorem [26] which did not dishearten the development of methods and tools for automatically
proving program correctness, the impossibility of VBB obfuscation represents a major challenge in developing
practical methods for hiding sensitive information in programs that guarantee secure non-disclosure, e.g., for
a limited amount of time or against specific attacks.
The current state of the art in code protection by obfuscation is characterised by a scattered set of methods
and commercial/open-source techniques employing often ad hoc transformations that complicate code yet
keeping its functionality, see [9] for an excellent survey. Examples of obfuscating transformations include code
flattening to remove control-flow graph structures, randomised block execution to inhibit control-flow graph
reconstruction by dynamic analysis, and variable (data) splitting to obfuscate data structures. In Figure 1 we
show the obfuscation of a simple iterative Fibonacci function as an example of what we mean by obfuscation.
We can observe the increase of program variables, a flattened code structure, here depicted in a sequence
of tests, driven by a dispatcher whose block selector is determined by complex numerical expressions which
are computed at each program block, and weird numbers used to hide internal data-flow and values. While
all these techniques can be combined together to protect the code from several models of attack, it is worth
noting that each obfuscation strategy is designed to protect the code from one particular kind of attack.
However, as most of these techniques are empirical, the major challenges in code protecting transformations
are: (1) the design of provably correct code transformations that do not inject flaws when protecting code,
and (2) the ability to prove that a certain obfuscation strategy is more effective than another w.r.t. some
given attack model.
In this paper we consider a quite general model of attack, propose a measure to compare different obfuscations
and define a best obfuscation strategy.
1.2. The challenge
There are several ways in which formal methods, like model checking and abstract interpretation, can be
useful for an attacker. For example they can serve to discover software vulnerabilities to be exploited for
inject malicious code or to defeat software protection (see e.g. [27, 30, 15]). Some recent approaches aims at
the automatic deobfuscation and reverse engineer of protected code [34, 33, 13, 21, 20].
More in general, the aim of any attack is to disclose some program property. Due to the undecidability of
generic program analysis and impossibility of VBB obfuscation, measuring the potency of a code transfor-
mation defeating WB attacks means specifying precisely the perimeter of the possible attack model. We
focus on program properties expressible as formulas in ∀CTL*, because they cover a wide range of program
properties the attacker may want to disclose. For example, it is known that many data-flow analyses can
be cast to model checking of safety formulas. Indeed, computing the results of a set of data-flow equations
is equivalent to computing a set of states that satisfies a given modal/temporal logic specification [28, 29].
Even if several interesting properties are not directly expressed as safety properties, because they are exis-
tentially quantified over paths, their complements are relevant as well and are indeed safety properties, i.e.
they are requested to hold for all reachable states. As we explain later, abstraction techniques (like abstract
interpretation and abstract model checking), are necessary for the attacker to cope with the complexity of
program analysis to reduce the time and the resources that need to be invested in disclosing the property.
As a concrete example of sensible program properties, suppose the attacker is interested in disclosing the
live variables of a program. Roughly speaking, a variable x is live at a program point iff there exists a
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Fig. 1. Source and obfuscated Fibonacci code
path that uses its value before it is modified. We recall that x is modified if it appears in the left-hand side
of an assignment and it is used if it appears in a guard or in the right-hand side of an assignment to a
variable y 6= x. Knowing that a variable is non-live can allow to discard large portions of dead code and
thus to simplify the program analysis. The study of liveness of a variable x can be done by model checking a
stronger property in ∀CTL* that formalises the following: at least an instruction using the value of x should
be executed between any two different modifications of x. As we explain later this property is called in the
literature very busy expression. As a simple example, consider the following program written in pseudocode
taken from [29].
1: while (even(x)) {
2: x = x div 2;
3: } y = 2;
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Fig. 2. Counterexample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) framework
Note that x satisfies the previous property because: 1) if the values stored in x is odd it is never modified;
and 2) if it is even, then x is modified within the body of the loop but then it is used in the guard of the
loop. Formally, this can be proved by model-checking an abstraction of the concrete Kripke structure, where
the values of x are partitioned in two classes: even values and odd values. This leads to a simple abstract
model with just four states (whose size is independent from the initial value of x and its range of values). We
show how this program can be obfuscated to make the analysis as hardest as possible in Section 5: proving
the same property on the obfuscated program will require to consider an abstract model whose number of
states grows linearly with the size of the domain of x.
In this context, program analysis is therefore the model checking of a ∀CTL* formula on a possibly abstract
model associated with the program. The complexity of software analysis requires automated methods and
tools for WB attack to code. Since the attacker aims to disclose the property within a bounded time and using
bounded resources, approximate methods such as abstract interpretation [10] or abstract model checking [5]
are useful to cope with the complexity of the problem. Abstraction allows to consider sets of values (instead
of all individual values separately) for the same variable, thus reducing the overall number of states in
the model, while keeping only the relevant information which is necessary for the analysis. Safety properties
expressed in ∀CTL* can be model-checked using abstraction refinement techniques (CEGAR [4]) as in Fig. 2.
An initial (over-approximated) abstraction of the program is model-checked against the property φ. If the
verification proves that φ holds, then it is disclosed. Similarly, if an abstract counterexample is found that
corresponds to a concrete counterexample, it is disclosed that φ is not valid. An abstract counterexample
that is present in the existential over-approximation but not in the concrete model is called spurious. If a
spurious counterexample is found the abstraction is refined to eliminate it and the verification is repeated
on the refined abstraction. Of course, the coarser the abstraction that can be used to verify the property is,
the more effective the attack is. Indeed, the worst case for the attacker is when the verification cycle must
be repeated until the refined abstraction coincides with the concrete model.
1.3. Contribution
We propose a systematic model deformation that induces a systematic transformation on the program
(obfuscation). The idea is to transform the source program in such a way that:
1. its semantics is preserved: the model of the original program is isomorphic to the (reachable) part of the
model of the obfuscated program (Theorem 4.1);
2. the performance is preserved;
3. the property φ that one wants to hide is preserved by the transformation (Theorem 4.2);
4. such transformation forces the CEGAR framework to ultimately refine the abstract model of the trans-
formed program into the concrete model of the original program (Theorem 4.3). Therefore any abstraction-
based model checking on the obfuscated program becomes totally ineffective.
CEGAR can be viewed as a learning procedure, devoted to learn the partition (abstraction) which provides
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a (bisimulation) state equivalence. Our transformation makes this procedure extremely inefficient. Note that
several instances of the CEGAR framework are possible depending on the chosen abstraction and refinement
techniques (e.g. predicate refinement, partition refinement) and that CEGAR can be used in synergy with
other techniques for compact representation of the state space (e.g., BDD) and for approximating the best
refined abstraction (e.g., SAT solvers). Notably, CEGAR is employed in state-of-the-art tools as Microsoft’s
SLAM engine for the SDV framework [23] and, more in general, in automatic software verification tools like
the open-source software verifier CPAchecker [22]. Here we focus on the original formulation of CEGAR
based on partition refinement, but we believe that our technique can be extended to all the other settings.
By understanding the model structures that make CEGAR inefficient we provide a better understanding of
the limitations of abstraction refinement.
As many obfuscating transformations, our method relies on the concept of opaque expressions and opaque
predicate that are expressions whose value is difficult for the attacker to figure out. Opaque predicates
and expressions are formulas whose value is uniquely determined (i.e. a constant), independently from the
parameters they receive, but this is not immediately evident from the way in which the formula is written.
For example it can be proved that the formula x2 − 34y2 6= 1 is always true for any integer values of x and
y. Analogously, the formula (x2 + x) mod 2 6= 0 is always false. These expression/predicate are, in general,
constructed using number properties that are hard for an adversary to evaluate. Of course such predicates
can be parameterised so that each instance will look slightly different. Opaque predicates/expressions are
often used to inject dead code in the obfuscated program in such a way that program analysis cannot just
discard it. For example, if the guard x2 − 34y2 6= 1 is used in a conditional statement, then the program
analysis should consider both the ”then” and the ”else” branches, while only the first is actually executable.
In this paper: i) opaque expressions will be used to hide from the attacker the initial values of the new
variables introduced by our obfuscation procedure; and ii) opaque predicates will be used to add some form
of nondeterminism originated from model deformations. The effects of the opaque expressions and predicates
will be similar: since the attacker will not be able to figure out their actual values, all the possible values
have to be taken into account.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2 we recall CEGAR and fix the notation. In Section 3 we introduce the
concept of model deformation and define the measure of obfuscation w.r.t. a given property. In Section 4
we define a best obfuscation strategy and state the main results. In Section 5 we show how to apply our
approach to obfuscate flow analysis. Some concluding remarks are in Section 6
This article is the full and revised version of the article published in [3]. More precisely, the new contributions
of this paper with respect to [3] are:
• the entire step-by-step application of our obfuscation technique to the running example;
• the application of our approach to the class of data-flow analyses (see the introduction and Section 5);
• the inclusion of extended definitions and explanations to make the paper self-contained;
• the inclusion of all proofs of main results.
Related works. With respect to previous approaches to code obfuscation, all intended to defeat specific ab-
stractions viewed as code attacks, our main contribution is to define the first transformation that defeats the
refinement strategy, making our approach independent on the specific attack carried out by abstract model
checking. The use of model-driven reasoning gives a clear advantage over existing methods. By exploiting
the abstraction refinement algorithms we can make the effort of refining an attack hard in an optimal way.
Most existing works dealing with practical code obfuscation are motivated by either empirical evaluation
or by showing how specific models of attack are defeated, e.g., decompilation, program analysis, tracing,
debugging (see [9] for a comprehensive survey of most known methods for making code secure). Along these
lines, [32] firstly considered the problem of defeating specific and well identified attacks, in this case control-
flow structures. More recently [1] shows how suitable transformations may defeat symbolic execution attacks.
We follow a similar approach in defeating abstract model-checking attacks by making abstraction refinements
maximally inefficient. The advantage in our case is in the fact that we consider abstraction refinements as
targets of our code protecting transformations. This allows us both to extract suitable metrics and to apply
our transformations to all model checking-based attacks.
A first attempt to formalise in a unique framework a variety of models of attack has been done in [16, 12, 17]
in terms of abstract interpretation. The idea is that, given an attack implemented as an abstract interpreter,
a transformation is derived that makes the corresponding abstract interpreter incomplete, namely returning
6 R. Bruni, R. Giacobazzi and R. Gori
the highest possible number of false alarms. The use of abstract interpretation has the advantage of making
it possible to include in the attack model the whole variety of program analysis tools. While this approach
provides methods for understanding and comparing qualitatively existing obfuscations with respect to specific
attacks defined as abstract interpreters, none of these approaches considers transformations that defeat the
abstraction refinement, namely the procedure that allows to improve the attack towards a full disclosure of
the obfuscated program properties.
Even if the relation between false alarms and spurious counterexamples is known [18] to the best of our
knowledge, no obfuscation methods have been developed in the context of formal verification by abstract
model checking, or more in general by exploiting structural properties of computational models and their
logic.
2. Setting The Context
2.1. Temporal logic and Abstract Model Checking
We consider the fragment ∀CTL* of the branching time temporal logic CTL* [6, 14]. The formulas in
∀CTL* do not contain existential quantifiers and the universal properties are expressed through the path
quantifier ∀ (“for all futures”) that quantifies over (infinite) execution sequences. The temporal operators
G (Generally, always), F (Finally, sometime) X (neXt time), and U (Until) express properties of a single
execution sequence. These operators, as well as other syntactic possibilities, can be freely nested in a formula.
Given a set Prop of propositions, ranged by p, q, ..., the set Lit of literals ` is defined as
Lit = Prop ∪ {¬q | q ∈ Prop} ∪ {true, false}.
State formulas φ and Path formulas ψ are inductively defined by the following grammar, where ` ∈ Lit
(observe that negation is present only at the level of literals):
State formulas: φ ::= ` | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ∀ψ
Path formulas: ψ ::= φ | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | Gψ | Fψ | Xψ | U(ψ,ψ)
Any state partition P ⊆ ℘(Σ) defines an abstraction merging states into abstract states, i.e., an abstract
state is a set of concrete states and the abstraction function αP : Σ → ℘(Σ) maps each state s into the
partition class αP (s) ∈ P that contains s. The abstraction function can be lifted to a pair of adjoint functions
αP : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) and γP : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ), such that for any X ∈ ℘(Σ), αP (X) =
⋃
x∈X P (x) [25]. When
the partition P is clear from the context we omit the subscript. A partition P with abstraction function α
induces an abstract Kripke structure KP = 〈Σ], R], I], ‖ · ‖]〉 that has abstract states in Σ] = P , ranged by
s], and is defined as the existential abstraction induced by P :
• R](s]1, s]2) iff ∃s, t ∈ Σ. R(s, t) ∧ α(s) = s]1 ∧ α(t) = s]2,
• s] ∈ I] iff ∃t ∈ I. α(t) = s],
• ‖ p ‖]def= { s] ∈ Σ] ∣∣ s] ⊆‖ p ‖ },
An abstract path in the abstract Kripke structure KP is denoted by pi] = {s]i}i∈N. The abstract path
associated with the concrete path pi = {si}i∈N is the sequence α(pi) = {α(si)}i∈N. Vice versa, we denote by
γ(pi]) the set of concrete paths whose abstract path is pi], i.e., γ(pi]) =
{
pi
∣∣ α(pi) = pi] }. A counterexample
to the formula φ is either a finite abstract path or an infinite one represented as a finite abstract path
followed by a loop. Abstract model checking is sound by construction: If there is a concrete counterexample
for φ then there is also an abstract counterexample for it . Spurious counterexamples may happen: If there
is an abstract counterexample for φ then there may or may not be a concrete counterexample for φ.
2.2. Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement
With an abstract Kripke structure K] and a formula φ, the CEGAR algorithm works as follows [4]. K] is
model checked against the formula. If no counterexample to K] |= φ is found, the formula φ is satisfied and we
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conclude. If a counterexample pi] is found which is not spurious, i.e., γ(pi]) 6= ∅, then we have an underlying
concrete counterexample and we conclude that φ is not satisfied. If the counterexample is spurious, i.e.,
γ(pi]) = ∅, then K] is further refined and the procedure is repeated. The procedure illustrated in Fig. 2
induces an abstract model-checker attacker that can be specified as follows in pseudocode.
Input: program p, property φ
P = init(p, φ);
K = kripke(P, p);
c = check(K,φ);
while (c != null && spurious(p, c)) {
P = refine(K, p, c);
K = kripke(P, p);
c = check(K,φ); }
return ((c == null),P);
Here we denote by init(·) a function that takes a program p and the property φ and returns an initial
abstraction P (a partition of variable domains); a function kripke(·) that generates the abstract Kripke
structure associated with a program p and the partition P ; a function check(·) that takes an abstract
Kripke structure K and a property φ and returns either null, if K |= φ, or a (deterministically chosen)
counterexample c; a predicate spurious that takes the program p and an abstract counterexample c and
returns true if c is a spurious counterexample and false otherwise; and a function refine(K, p, c) that returns
a partition refinement so to eliminate the spurious counterexample c. As the model is finite, the number of
partitions that refine the initial partition is also finite and the algorithm terminates by returning a pair: a
boolean that states the validity of the formula, and the final partition that allows to prove it.
If several spurious counterexamples exist, then the selection of one instead of another may influence the re-
finements that are performed. For example, the same refinement that eliminates a spurious counterexample
may cause the disappearance of several other ones. However, all the spurious counterexamples must be elim-
inated. When we assume that check(·) is deterministic, we just fix a total order on the way counterexamples
are found. For example, we may assume that a total order on states is given (e.g., lexicographic) and extend
it to paths.
Central in CEGAR is partition refinement. The algorithm identifies the shortest prefix {s#i }i∈[0,k+1] of the
abstract counterexample pi] that does not correspond to a concrete path in the model. The second to last
abstract state s#k in the prefix, called a failure state, is further partitioned by refining the equivalence classes
in such a way that the spurious counterexample is removed. To refine s#k , the algorithm classifies the concrete
states s ∈ s#k in three classes:
• Dead states: they are reachable states s ∈ s#k along the spurious counterexample prefix but they have no
outgoing transitions to the next states in the spurious counterexample, i.e., there is some concrete path
prefix pi ∈ γ({s#i }i∈[0,k]) such that s ∈ pi and for any s′ ∈ s#k+1 it holds ¬R(s, s′).
• Bad states: they are non-reachable states s ∈ s#k along the spurious counterexample prefix but have outgo-
ing transitions that cause the spurious counterexample, i.e., for any concrete path prefix pi ∈ γ({s#i }i∈[0,k])
we have s 6∈ pi, but R(s, s′) for some concrete state s′ ∈ s#k+1.
• Irrelevant states: they are neither dead nor bad, i.e., they are not reachable and have no outgoing
transitions to the next states in the counterexample.
Example 2.1 (Dead, bad and irrelevant states). Consider the abstract path prefix {s#0 , s#1 , s#2 , s#3 } in
Fig. 3. Each abstract state is represented as a set of concrete states (the smaller squares). The arrows are the
transitions of the concrete Kripke structure and they induce abstract transitions in the obvious way. We use
a thicker borderline to mark s#0 as an initial abstract state and a dashed borderline to mark s
#
2 as a failure
state. The only dead state in s#2 is r, because it can be reached via a concrete path from an initial state but
there is no outgoing transition to a state in s#3 . The states s and t are bad, because they are not reachable
from initial states, but have outgoing transitions to states in s#3 . The states u and w are irrelevant.
CEGAR looks for the coarsest partition that separates bad states from dead states. The partition is obtained
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Fig. 3. Dead, bad and irrelevant states
by refining the partition associated with each variable. The chosen refinement is not local to the failure
state, but it applies globally to all states: It defines a new abstract Kripke structure for which the spurious
counterexample is no longer valid. Finding the coarsest partition corresponds to keeping the size of the
new abstract Kripke structure as small as possible. This is known to be a NP-hard problem [4], due to the
combinatorial explosion in the number of ways in which irrelevant states can be combined with dead or bad
states. In practice, CEGAR applies a heuristic: irrelevant states are not combined with dead states. The
opposite option of separating bad states from both dead and irrelevant states is also viable.
In the following we assume that states in Σ are defined as assignments of values to a finite set of variables
x1, ..., xn that can take values in finite domains D1, ..., Dn. Partitions over states are induced by partitions
on domains. A partition P of variables x1, ..., xn is a function that sends each xi to a partition Pi = P (xi) ⊆
℘(Di). Given the abstractions associated with partitions P1, ..., Pn of the domains D1, ..., Dn, the states of
the abstract Kripke structure are defined by the possible ranges of values that are assigned to each variable
according to the corresponding partition.
2.3. Programs
We let P be the set of programs written in the syntax of guarded commands [7] (e.g., in the style of CSP,
Occam, XC), according to the grammar below:
d ::= x ∈ D | d, d g ::= x ∈ V | true | g ∧ g | g ∨ g | ¬g
a ::= x = e | a, a c ::= g ⇒ a | c|c p ::= (d; g; c)
where x is a variable, V ⊆ ⋃iDi is a finite set of values, and e is a well-defined expression over variables.
A basic declaration x ∈ D assigns a domain D to the variable x. A declaration is a non-empty list of basic
declarations. We assume that all the variables appearing in a declaration d are distinct. A basic guard is a
membership predicate x ∈ V or true. A guard g is a formula of propositional logic over basic guards. We
write x 6∈ V as a shorthand for ¬(x ∈ V ). An action is a non-empty list of assignments. A single assignment
x = e evaluates the expression e in the current state and updates x accordingly. If multiple assignments
x1 = e1, ..., xk = ek are present, the expressions e1, ..., ek are evaluated in the current state and their values
are assigned to the respective variables. We require that all the variables appearing in the left-hand side
of multiple assignments are distinct. As a consequence, the order of assignments is not relevant. A basic
command consists of a guarded command g ⇒ a: it checks if the guard g is satisfied by the current state,
in which case it executes the action a to update the state. Commands can be composed in parallel: any
guarded command whose guard is satisfied by the current state can be applied. A program (d; g; c) consists
of a declaration d, an initialisation proposition g and a command c, where all the variables in g and c are
declared in d.
Example 2.2 (A sample program). We consider the following running example program (in pseudocode)
that computes in y the square of the value initially stored in x.
1: y = 0;
2: while (x > 0) {
3: y = y + 2*x - 1;
4: x = x - 1;
5: } output(y);
For simplicity we assume the possible values assigned to variables are in quite limited ranges, but starting
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with larger sets of values would not change the outcome of the application of the CEGAR algorithm (in
particular the size of the abstract Kripke structure where the formula φ defined in Example 2.5 is satisfied
would not change). Let d be the declaration
d
def
= x ∈ {0, 1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
The translation of the previous program in the syntax of guarded commands is the program
p = (d ; g ; c1|c2a|c2b|c3|c4).
Intuitively, it is obtained by adding an explicit variable pc for the program-counter and then encoding each
line of the source code as a basic command. We write it below using CSP-like syntax to help the reading.
def x in {0,1,2} , y in {0,1,2,3,4,5} , pc in {1,2,3,4,5}; % d
init pc = 1; % g
do pc in {1} => pc=2, y=0 % c1 \
[] pc in {2} /\ x notin {0} => pc=3 % c2a |
[] pc in {2} /\ x in {0} => pc=5 % c2b > c
[] pc in {3} => pc=4, y=y+(2*x)-1 % c3 |
[] pc in {4} => pc=2, x=x-1 % c4 /
od
Note that when pc = 5 the program stops because no guarded command is applicable.
In this context, an attacker may want to check if y is ever assigned the value 2, which can be expressed as
the property: φ
def
= ∀ G (pc ∈ {1} ∨ y 6∈ {2}) (i.e. for all paths, for all states in the path it is never the case
that pc 6= 1 and y = 2).
Let d = (x1 ∈ D1, ..., xn ∈ Dn). A state s = (x1 = v1, ..., xn = vn) of the program (d; g; c) is an assignment
of values to all variables in d, such that for all i ∈ [1, n] we have vi ∈ Di and we write s(x) for the value
assigned to x in s. Given c = (g1 ⇒ a1| · · · |gk ⇒ ak), we write s |= gj if the guard gj holds in s and s[aj ] for
the state obtained by updating s with the assignment aj .
Example 2.3 (A sample execution). Suppose we take the initial state s0 = (x = 1, y = 1, pc = 1). The
only command whose guard is satisfied by s0 is c1 (s0 |= pc ∈ {1}). The execution of c1 updates the state
to s1 = s0[pc = 2, y = 0] = (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2). The only command whose guard is satisfied by s1 is c2a,
whose execution updates the state to s2 = s1[pc = 3] = (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 3). Then, the guard of c3 holds in
s2, leading to s3 = (x = 1, y = 1, pc = 4). In s3 the guard of c4 holds, leading to s4 = (x = 0, y = 1, pc = 2).
Finally, in s4 the guard of c2b holds, leading to s5 = (x = 0, y = 1, pc = 5), where the program stops because
none of the guards holds in s5.
The concrete Kripke structure K(p) = 〈Σ, R, I, ‖ · ‖〉 associated with p = (d; g; c) is defined as follows: the
set of states Σ is the set of all states of the program; the set of transitions R is the set of all and only
transitions (s, s′) such that there is a guarded command gj ⇒ aj in c with s |= gj and s′ = s[aj ]; the set
of initial states I is the set of all and only states that satisfy the guard g; the set of propositions is the set
of all sentences of the form xi ∈ V where i ∈ [1, n] and V ⊆ Di; the interpretation function is such that
‖ xi ∈ V ‖= {s | s(xi) ∈ V }.
Example 2.4 (A concrete Kripke structure). The Kripke structure associated with the program p
from Example 2.2 has 90 states, one for each possible combination of the values assigned to its variables
x, y, pc. The initial states are those where pc = 1 (they are 18 in total).
Example 2.5 (A step of CEGAR). Take again the program p and the property φ the attacker wants to
disclose from Example 2.2.
According to the CEGAR strategy, the attacker can start with the coarsest abstraction that partitions the
state according to the subformulas of φ and to the control flow conditions in the program. For the sake of the
example, here we choose to start with an even coarser abstraction than the above, this is always an option
(see [7]). Therefore, assume the attacker starts with the following initial partition:
x : {{0}, {1, 2}} y : {{2}, {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}} pc : {{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5}} (1)
The corresponding abstract Kripke structure has just 8 states (see Fig. 4) with 4 initial states marked with
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Fig. 4. An abstract Kripke structure
Fig. 5. Failure state
bold borderline in Fig. 4, where, to improve readability, we write, e.g., y = 01345 instead of the more verbose
y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}.
There are several paths that lead to counterexamples for φ. One such path is the one marked with bold arrows
in Fig. 4. It is detailed in Fig. 5 by showing the underlying concrete states. It is a spurious counterexample,
because there is no underlying concrete path. The abstract failure state is (x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5}), depicted with dashed borderline in Fig. 4. It contains one bad concrete state (x = 1, y = 1, pc =
3), two dead states ((x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2) and (x = 2, y = 0, pc = 2)) and 37 irrelevant states (see
Fig. 5, where the underlying concrete states of the abstract failure state (x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5}) are shown).
By applying the CEGAR refinement we get the following refined partition (remember that irrelevant states
can be merged with bad ones but not with dead ones):
x : {{0}, {1, 2}} y : {{2}, {0}, {1, 3, 4, 5}} pc : {{1}, {2}, {3, 4, 5}} (2)
Thus the corresponding abstract Kripke structure has now 18 states 6 of which are initial states. While the
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Fig. 6. A detail of a deformation
previously considered spurious counterexample has been removed, another one can be found and, therefore,
the CEGAR refinement must be repeated, (see Fig. 7 discussed in Example 3.1 for further steps).
3. Model Deformations
We introduce a systematic model deformation making CEGAR hard. The idea is to transform the Kripke
structure, by adding states and transitions in a conservative way. We want to somehow preserve the semantics
of the model, while making the abstract model checking based on the CEGAR refinement strategy less
efficient, in the sense that only trivial (identical) partitions can be used to prove the property. In other
words, any non-trivial abstraction induces at least one spurious counterexample.
LetM be the domain of all models specified as Kripke structures. Formally, a model deformation is a mapping
between Kripke structures D : M → M such that for a given formula φ and K ∈ M: K |= φ ⇒ D(K) |= φ
and there exists a partition P such that KP |= φ ⇒ D(KP ) 6|= φ. In this case we say that D is a deformation
for the partition P . Thus, a model deformation makes abstract model checking imprecise yet keeping the
validity of the given formula.
Moreover, we show that the deformation of the Kripke structures we consider are induced by transformations
of the source program, that act as an obfuscation strategy against an attack specified by an abstract model-
checker + CEGAR. Accordingly, we say that an obfuscation is a transformation O : P → P such that for a
given formula φ and program p ∈ P: K(p) |= φ ⇒ K(O(p)) |= φ and there exists a partition P such that
K(p)P |= φ ⇒ K(O(p))P 6|= φ.
3.1. An Example
Consider the program p from Example 2.2. The first step of refinement with the CEGAR algorithm with
the initial partition (1) (described in Example 2.5) results in the partition (2). Intuitively, a deformation of
the Kripke structure that forced the CEGAR algorithm to split the sets of variable values in classes smaller
than the ones in partition (2) would weaken the power of CEGAR.
To this aim, consider a deformation D(K) of the concrete Kripke structure K of Example 2.4 obtained by
duplicating K in such a way that one copy is kept isomorphic to the original one, while the second copy is
modified by adding and removing some transitions to make the CEGAR algorithm less efficient. The copies
can be obtained by introducing a new variable z ∈ {1, 2}: for z = 1 we preserve all transitions, while for z = 2
we change them to force a finer partition when a step of the CEGAR algorithm is applied. For example, in
the replica for z = 2, let us transform the copy of the dead state (x = 2, y = 0, pc = 2) into a bad state.
This is obtained by adding and removing some transitions. After this transformation, assuming an initial
partition analogous to partition (1),
x : {{0}, {1, 2}} y : {{2}, {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}} pc : {{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5}} z : {{1, 2}}
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where all the values of the new variable z are kept together, we obtain an abstract Kripke structure isomorphic
to the one of Fig. 4, with the same counterexamples. However, when we focus on the spurious counterexample,
the situation is slightly changed. This is shown in Fig. 6, where the relevant point is the overall shape of
the model and not the actual identity of each node. Roughly it combines two copies of the states in Fig. 5:
those with z = 1 are on the left and those with z = 2 are on the right. The abstract state (x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈
{0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, z ∈ {1, 2}) is still a failure state, but it has three bad states and three dead
states:
bad states dead states
( x = 1 , y = 1 , pc = 3 , z = 1 ) ( x = 1 , y = 0 , pc = 2 , z = 1 )
( x = 1 , y = 1 , pc = 3 , z = 2 ) ( x = 1 , y = 0 , pc = 2 , z = 2 )
( x = 2 , y = 0 , pc = 2 , z = 2 ) ( x = 2 , y = 0 , pc = 2 , z = 1 )
The bad state (x = 2, y = 0, pc = 2, z = 2) and the dead states (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2, z = 2) and
(x = 1, y = 4, pc = 3, z = 1) are incompatible. Therefore, the refinement leads to the partition
x : {{0}, {1}, {2}} z : {{1}, {2}} y : {{2}, {0}, {1, 3, 4, 5}} pc : {{1}, {2}, {3, 4, 5}}
where all values of x are separated. In Section 4 we show how this deformation is derived from a systematic
obfuscation of the program.
3.2. Measuring Obfuscations
Intuitively, the larger the size of the abstract Kripke structure to be model checked without spurious coun-
terexamples is, the harder is for the attacker to reach its goal. The interesting case is of course when the
property φ holds, but the abstraction used by the attacker leads to spurious counterexamples.
We propose to measure and compare obfuscations on the basis of the size of the abstract Kripke structure
where the property can be directly proved. Since the attacker has limited resources, a good obfuscation is
the one that forces the attacker to model check a Kripke structure as large as possible, thus diminishing
the usefulness of the abstraction. Computing the size of the more abstract Kripke structure that allows to
prove the property is theoretically sound but impractical because finding it is an NP-hard problem. This is
exactly the reason why CEGAR applies some heuristic to approximate the best abstraction. Therefore we
propose to exploit CEGAR to give a bound that can be effectively computed. Note that, in the same spirit
as CEGAR, here the number of refinements is less relevant than the size of the abstract Kripke structure
that the attacker has to finally check.
As the abstract states are generated by a partition of the domains of each variable, the size is obtained
just as the product of the number of partition classes for each variable. As obfuscations can introduce any
number of additional variables over arbitrary domains, we consider only the size induced by the variables in
the original program (otherwise increasing the number of variables could increase the measure of obfuscation
without necessarily making CEGAR ineffective).
In the following we assume that p is a program with variables X and variables of interest Y ⊆ X and φ is
the formula that the attacker wants to prove.




Definition 3.2 (Measure of obfuscation). Let O(p) be an obfuscated program. The measure of O(p)
w.r.t. φ and Y , written #YφO(p), is the size of the final partition P w.r.t. Y as computed by the above model
of the attacker.
Our definition is parametric w.r.t. to the heuristics implemented in check() (choice of the counterexample)
and refine() (how to partition irrelevant states).
There are several reasons why the above measure is more significant than other choices, like taking into
account the number (and the size) of refinements traversed by CEGAR. The main one is that our measure is
independent from the order in which spurious counterexamples are eliminated. In fact, the refinement used to
eliminate one particular spurious counterexample can also eliminate other ones and diminish the number of
necessary refinements. Having to consider the permutations of the spurious counterexamples would make the
Code Obfuscation Against Abstraction Refinement Attacks 13
Fig. 7. A refined abstract Kripke structure
measure impractical. Moreover, it allows for the definition of an optimal obfuscation, because it is bounded
by the size of the concrete Kripke structure. This would not be the case if the number of refinements were
accounted for.
Definition 3.3 (Comparing obfuscations). Given a program p and a formula φ and a set of variables
Y , the obfuscation O1(p) is as good as O2(p), written O1(p) ≥Yφ O2(p), if #YφO1(p) ≥ #YφO2(p).
It follows that the best measure associated with an obfuscation is
∏
y∈Y |Dy|, where Dy denotes the domain
of y. This is the case where the abstraction separates all the concrete values that the variables in Y may
assume. Note that any obfuscation whose measure is
∏
y∈Y |Dy| makes any abstraction useless to prove the
property.
Example 3.1 (Ctd.). Let us consider again the running example and compare it with the semantically
equivalent program p′ below:
def x in {0,1,2}, y in {0,1,2,3,4,5}, pc in {1,2};
init pc = 1;
do pc in {1} => pc=2, y=x*x
od
Let x, y be the variables of interest. We have #
{x,y}
φ p
′ = 2, because the initial partition (1) is sufficient to
prove that the property φ holds.
For the obfuscated program p, the size of the initial partition is just 4 (see partition (1) and the corre-
sponding abstract Kripke structure in Fig. 4), and after one step of the CEGAR refinement the size of the
computed partition is 6 (see partition (2) and the corresponding Kripke structure in Fig. 7). Since spurious
counterexamples are still present, one more step of refinement is needed. When the attacker executes the
procedure on the failure state marked with dashed border in Fig. 7, the result is the partition
x : {{0}, {1}, {2}} y : {{0}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 5}} pc : {{1}, {2}, {4}, {3, 5}}
whose size is 15 as it has been necessary to split all values for x and most values for y. Now no more
(spurious) counterexample can be found because all the states that invalidate the property are not reachable
from initial states. Thus #
{x,y}
φ p = 15, while the best obfuscation would have measure 18, which is the
product of the sizes of the domains of x and y. As the reader may expect, we conclude that p ≥{x,y}φ p′.
In our running example, for simplicity, we have exploited a very small domain for each variable, but if we
take larger domains of values, then #
{x,y}
φ p
′ and #{x,y}φ p remain unchanged, while the measure of the best
possible obfuscation would grow considerably. This is because the partition
x : {{0}, {1}, {2, 3, ..., n}} y : {{0}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 5, ...,m}} pc : {{1}, {2}, {4}, {3, 5}}
offers a valid abstraction to prove the property independently from the upper limits n and m.
In the next section we will show how to automatically generate such a best obfuscation.
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4. Best Code Obfuscation Strategy
In the following, given an abstract Kripke structure K and a property φ, we let Sφ denote the set of abstract
states that contain only concrete states that satisfy φ, and Sφ be the set with at least one concrete state
that does not satisfy φ. We denote by Oφ the obfuscation strategy realised by the following algorithm.
Input: program p, property φ
1: P = init(p, φ);
2: K = kripke(P, p);
3: (p,K,w, vw) = fresh(p,K);
4: (p,K, z, vz) = fresh(p,K);
5: S = cover(P );
6: foreach s# ∈ S {
// failure path preparation (lines 7-12, Cases 1-2)
7: pi# = failurepath(s#,K, p, φ);
8: while (pi# == null) {
9: if (not reach(s#,K, p, φ)
10: (p,K, vw) = makereachable(s#,K, p, φ, w, vw);
11: else (p,K, vw) = makefailstate(s#,K, p, φ, w, vw);
12: pi# = failurepath(s#,K, p, φ); }
// main cycle (lines 13-19, Case 3)
13: foreach (xi, v1, v2) ∈ compatible(s#, pi#, p) {
14: (s, t) = pick(xi, v1, v2, s#);
15: if dead(t, s#, pi#, p)
16: (p,K, vz) = dead2bad(t, s#, pi#,K, p, z, vz);
17: else if bad(t, s#, pi#, p)
18: (p,K, vz) = bad2dead(t, s#, pi#,K, p, z, vz);
19: else (p,K, vz) = irr2dead(t, s#, pi#,K, p, z, vz); }
20: } return p;
The algorithm starts by computing an initial partition P and the corresponding abstract Kripke structure
K. We want to modify the concrete Kripke structure so that CEGAR will split the abstract states in trivial
partition classes for the variables of interest. The idea is to create several replicas of the concrete Kripke
structure, such that one copy is preserved while the others will be changed by introducing and deleting
transitions. This is obtained by introducing a new variable z over a suitable domain Dz = {1, ..., n} such
that the concrete Kripke structure is replicated for each value z can take. As a matter of notation, we
denote by (s, z = v) the copy of the concrete state s where z = v. Without loss of generality, we assume
that for z = 1 we keep the original concrete Kripke structure. In practice such value of z is hidden by an
opaque expression. Actually we use two fresh variables, named w and z (lines 3 and 4): the former is used
to introduce spurious counterexamples and failure states in the replica and the latter to force the splitting
of failure states into trivial partition classes. The function fresh(·) updates the program p and the Kripke
structure K by taking into account the new variables and initialises the variables vw and vz that keep track
of the last used values for w and z. When a new replica is created, such values are incremented.
The function cover(·) (at line 5) takes the initial partition P and returns a set of abstract states s#1 , ..., s#k ,
called a covering, such that, together, they cover all non-trivial1 partition classes of the domains of the
variable of interest, i.e. for each variable xi, with i ∈ [1, n], for each class C ∈ P (xi) such that |C| > 1 there
is an abstract state s#j with j ∈ [1, k] and a concrete state s ∈ s#j such that s(xi) ∈ C. Note that the set of
all abstract states is a (redundant) covering.
For each s# ∈ {s#1 , ..., s#k } in the covering, there are three possibilities:
1. s# does not contain any concrete state that is reachable via a concrete path that traverses only abstract
states in Sφ;
1 A partition class is trivial if it contains only one value.
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2. s# is not a failure state but it contains at least one concrete state that is reachable via a concrete path
that traverses only abstract states in Sφ;
3. s# is already the failure state of a spurious counterexample.
In case (3), failurepath(s#,K, p, φ) (line 7) returns an abstract path that is a counterexample for φ, in the
other cases the function failurepath(s#,K, p, φ) returns null and the algorithm enters a cycle (to be executed
at most twice, see lines 8–12) that transforms the Kripke structure and the program to move from cases (1–
2) back to case (3), in a way that we will explain later. Once a failure path pi# is found whose failure
state is s#, we consider the partition of concrete states in s# in the three classes bad, dead and irrelevant.
The goal of lines 13–19 is to create enough replicas so that all concrete states in s# will be separated by
CEGAR. Whenever two values v1 and v2 for the variable xi would be kept in the same partition we need
to force their split. The function compatible(s#, pi#, p) returns the set of all such triples and the function
pick(xi, v1, v2, s
#) returns two states s and t in s# that differs only for the value of xi (it must be v1 in one
case and v2 in the other case). Note that any two such states are either: (i) of the same kind (both bad,
both dead, both irrelevant), or (ii) one irrelevant and the other bad. Depending on the kind of t, we create
a replica (with a different value for z) using the functions dead2bad(·), bad2dead(·) or irr2dead(·) such that
s and t are no more compatible and thus the value v1 and v2 for xi will be split by CEGAR. The detail of
the transformations are presented below.
Case (3) (lines 13–19). The core of the algorithm applies to a failure state s# of a spurious counterexample
pi#. In this case the obfuscation method has to guarantee that the CEGAR refinement will split the failure
state s# by separating all values in the domains of the variables of interest.
Remember that CEGAR classifies the concrete states in s# in three classes (bad, dead and irrelevant) and
that dead states cannot be merged with bad or irrelevant states. We say that two states that can be merged
are compatible. The role of the new copies of the Kripke structure is to prevent any merge between concrete
states in the set s#. This is done by making sure that whenever two concrete states (s, z = 1), (t, z = 1) ∈ s#
can be merged into the same partition by the CEGAR algorithm, then the states (s, z = vz + 1) and
(t, z = vz + 1) cannot be merged together, because one is dead and the other is bad or irrelevant.
The function compatible(s#, pi#, p) returns the set of triples (xi, {v1, v2}) such that xi is a variable of interest
and any pair of states (s, xi = v1), (s, xi = v2) ∈ s# that differ just for the value of xi are compatible. Thus,
the cycle at line 13 considers all such triples to make them incompatible. At line 14, we pick any two
compatible states (s, z = 1) and (t, z = 1) such that s(xi) = v1, t(xi) = v2 and s(x) = t(x) for any variable
x 6= xi. Given the spurious counterexample pi# with failure state s# and a concrete state t ∈ s# for the
program p, the predicate dead(·) returns true if the state (t, z = 1) is dead (line 15). Similarly, the predicate
bad(·) returns true if the state (t, z = 1) is bad (line 17).
If (t, z = 1) is dead (w.r.t. s# and pi#), then it means that (s, z = 1) is also dead (because they are
compatible), so we apply a dead-to-bad transformation to t in the replica for z = vz + 1. This is achieved by
invoking the function dead2bad(·) (line 16) to be described below. The transformations bad2dead(·) (line 18)
and irr2dead(·) (line 19) apply to the other classifications for (t, z = 1). In more details, in lines 16, 18 and 19
we are concerned with the addition/removal of transitions to replica of the Kripke structure for z = vz + 1
so that a concrete state changes its classification.
In the following, given a concrete state s = (x1 = w1, ..., xn = wn), we denote by G(s) the guard x1 ∈
{w1} ∧ ... ∧ xn ∈ {wn} and by A(s) the assignment x1 = w1, ..., xn = wn. Without loss of generality, in the
following descriptions of transformations, we assume for brevity that the abstract counterexample is formed
by the abstract path prefix pi# = {s#0 , s#1 , s#, s#2 }, with s# the failure state and t is the concrete state in
s# that we want to transform (see Figs. 8–10).
dead2bad(·). To make t bad, the function must remove all concrete paths to t along the abstract counterex-
ample pi# and add one transition from t to some concrete state t′ in s#2 . To remove all concrete paths it is
enough to remove the transitions from states in s#1 to t (see Fig. 8). At the code level, dead2bad(·) modifies
each command g ⇒ a such that there is some s′ ∈ s#1 with s′ |= g and t = s′[a]. Given t and s#1 , let
S(g ⇒ a) = {s′ ∈ s#1 | s′ |= g ∧ t = s[a]}. Each command c = (g ⇒ a) such that S(c) 6= ∅ is changed to the
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Fig. 8. From dead to bad









When z 6= vz + 1 the updated command is applicable whenever c was applicable. When z = vz + 1 the
command is not applicable to the states in S(c). To add the transition from t to a state t′ in s#2 it is enough
to add the command z ∈ {vz + 1} ∧G(t)⇒ A(t′).
bad2dead(·). The function selects a dead state t′ in the failure state s# and a concrete path pi = s0, s′, t′ to
t′ along the abstract counterexample pi#. To make t dead in the replica with z = vz + 1, the function adds
a concrete transition from s′ to t and removes all transitions leaving from t to concrete states in s#2 (see
Fig. 9). To insert the transition from s′ to t, the command G(s′)∧ z ∈ {vz + 1} ⇒ A(t) is added. To remove
all transitions leaving from t to concrete states in s#2 , the function changes the guard g of each command
g ⇒ a such that t |= g and t[a] ∈ s#2 to g ∧ (z 6∈ {vz + 1} ∨ ¬G(t)), which is applicable to all the states
different from t where g ⇒ a was applicable as well as to the replicas of t for z 6= vz + 1.
irr2dead(·). To make t dead, the function builds a concrete path to t along the abstract counterexample
pi#. As before, it selects a dead state t′ in the failure state and a concrete path pi = s0, s′, t′ to s along the
abstract counterexample s#0 , s
#
1 , s
#. To make t dead the function adds a transition from s′ (i.e., the state
that immediately precedes t′ in pi) to t (see Fig. 10). For the program it is sufficient to add a new command
with guard G(s′) ∧ z ∈ {vz + 1} and whose assignment is A(t).
From cases (1–2) to case (3) (lines 7–12). The predicate reach(s#,K, p, φ) is true if we are in case (2)
and false if we are in case (1). In both cases we apply some preliminary transformations to K and p after which
s# is brought to case (3). The functions makereachable(·) and makefailstate(·) perform such transformations
by returning a modified programs and its corresponding modified Kripke structure.2
2 At the code level, addition and removal of transitions is realised as detailed before.
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Fig. 10. From irrelevant to dead
Fig. 11. Case 1
In more details, the function makereachable(s#,K, p, φ, w, vw) transforms the Kripke structure so that in the
end s# contains at least one concrete state that is reachable via a concrete path that traverses only abstract
states in Sφ, moving from case (1) to cases (2) or (3), while the function makefailstate(s
#,K, p, φ, w, vw)
takes s# satisfying case (2) and it returns a modified Kripke structure where s# now falls in case (3). Before
applying makereachable(·), s# does not contain any concrete state that is reachable via a concrete path that
traverses only abstract states in Sφ. The function makereachable(·) selects a concrete path pi such that its
abstract counterpart α(pi) goes trough states in Sφ. Let s be the last concrete state of pi. For w = vw + 1
it selects a concrete state t ∈ s# and adds a transition from s to t (see Fig. 11, where α(pi) = (s#0 , s#1 , s#2 )





# ∈ Sφ). If s# is a failure state we are back to case (3), otherwise we move to case (2). To
transform s# into a failure state, makefailstate(·) adds a transition from a non-reachable state t 6= s in s#
to some concrete state t′ such that α(t′) ∈ Sφ (see Fig. 12, where s#0 , s#1 , s# ∈ Sφ and s#2 ∈ Sφ). We note
that the selected state t must be non-reachable before the transformation: if t has some incoming transitions,
they must be deleted. Now s# is a failure state and we are back to case (3).
4.1. Main Results
We are now ready to state the main results of the paper.
First, we want to guarantee that the semantics of the program is preserved by the obfuscation. Intuitively,
this is because all the obfuscations we have discussed maintain the original Kripke structure associated with
a distinguished value of the new variables w and z that are introduced. Indeed, we prove that when the
obfuscated program is executed with initial values w = 1 and z = 1 it is guaranteed to behave exactly as the
original program: if the attacker were given the extra power to guess the right values for z and w, then the
reachable part of the deformed Kripke structure would be isomorphic to the Kripke structure of the original
program. This can be prevented, e.g., by exploiting opaque expressions to initialise the variables w and z,
thus hiding the right values to use from the attacker: since the attacker cannot disclose the value returned
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Fig. 12. Case 2
by opaque expressions, he has to take into account all possible values for w and z and thus run CEGAR on
the deformed Kripke structure.
Theorem 4.1 (Embedding). For p = (d; g; c) and its obfuscated version Oφ(p) = ((d, z ∈ Dz); g; c′), then
K(p) is isomorphic to K((d,w ∈ {1}, z ∈ {1}); g; c′).
Proof. Let w and z be the fresh variables. By construction, when we introduce a new value for w or z and
add a command g ⇒ a, then there is a distinguished value vw of w (respectively, vz of z) for which the
guard g is falsified in any state where w = 1 (respectively z = 1). Moreover, when we modify a command
c = (g ⇒ a) to c′ = (g′ ⇒ a), the assignment is not changed and for any state s where w = 1 (respectively
z = 1) we have s |= g iff s |= g′. In more detail:
• dead to bad transformation:
– for each command c = (g ⇒ a) that is changed to the command
g ∧
(





we immediately have that when z = 1 the predicate z 6∈ {vz + 1} is true and the guard g ∧(




is logically equivalent to g.
– the added command z ∈ {vz + 1} ∧G(t)⇒ A(t′) is clearly not applicable when z = 1.
• bad to dead transformation:
– the added command G(s′) ∧ z ∈ {vz + 1} ⇒ A(t) is clearly not applicable when z = 1.
– for each command g ⇒ a that is changed into g ∧ (z 6∈ {vz + 1} ∨ ¬G(t))⇒ a, we immediately have
that when z = 1 the predicate z 6∈ {vz +1} is true and the guard g∧ (z 6∈ {vz +1}∨¬G(t)) is logically
equivalent to g.
• irrelevant to dead transformation: the guard G(s′) ∧ z ∈ {vz + 1} of the added command G(s′) ∧ z ∈
{vz + 1} ⇒ A(t) does not apply to states where z = 1.
For the cases (1) and (2), the required transformations are analogous to the ones discussed above.
The isomorphism at the level of Kripke structures guarantees that the obfuscation does not affect the
number of steps required by any computation, i.e., to some extent the efficiency of the original program is
also preserved.
Second, the obfuscation preserves the property φ of interest when the program is executed with any input
data for w and z, i.e. φ is valid in all replicas.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). K(p) |= φ iff K(Oφ(p)) |= φ.
Proof. If K(p) 6|= φ, then a counterexample can be found in the original Kripke structure that by Theorem 4.1
is present also in K(Oφ(p)). If K(p) |= φ, then by construction, only spurious counterexamples are added.
To see this, let us consider the different transformations. When a bad or irrelevant state s is transformed to
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a dead state, it is made reachable, but we remove any outgoing transition that leads to a state where the
property is violated. When a dead state s is transformed to a bad state, we do add a transition to a state
where the property is violated, but we make s not reachable.
It is worth to mention that the isomorphism at the level of Kripke structures from Theorem 4.1 guarantees
that the semantics is preserved entirely, i.e. not only φ is preserved in all replicas (Theorem 4.2) but any
other property is preserved when the obfuscated program is run with w ∈ {1} and z ∈ {1}.
The next result guarantees the optimality of obfuscated programs.
Theorem 4.3 (Hardness). #YφOφ(p) =
∏
y∈Y |Dy|.
Proof. Let X = {x1, ..., xn}. By contradiction, let P be the final partition computed by the model-checker
attacker and suppose that the size of P w.r.t. X is strictly less than
∏n
i=1 |Dxi |. Then, it means that there is
at least one variable xi and two values v1, v2 ∈ Dxi that are in the same partition class of P . But this is not
possible, because for any pair of values v1, v2 that xi can take, by construction of Oφ(p) there are at least two
incompatible states (t, xi = v1) and (t, xi = v2) that should have been separated by the CEGAR algorithm.
This is a consequence of the fact that we have chosen a cover at line 5 of our obfuscation algorithm.
As a consequence, for any program p and formula φ the function mapping K(p) into K(Oφ(p)) is a model
deformation for all (non-trivial) partitions of the variables of interest.
Theorem 4.4 (Complexity). The complexity of our best code obfuscation strategy is polynomial in the
size of the domains of the variables of interest Y .
Proof. To estimate the complexity of the best code obfuscation strategy, note that the relevant part of the
algorithm is the cycle on lines 12–18 and that the number of required transformations depends linearly in the
number of variables of interest and quadratically on the size of their domains. In fact, the number of pairs
of values to be distinguished for the variable x is at most |Dx| · (|Dx|− 1)/2 and we need one transformation
for each such pair. Note however, that in general not all pairs are to be considered and that the same
transformation can distinguish more than one pair of values.
Finally, it is worth noting that the obfuscation that we have discussed assumes that the procedure of CEGAR
makes dead states incompatible with both irrelevant and bad states. Even if the attacker followed a more
general procedure, where dead states are only incompatible with bad states, our obfuscation strategy can
immediately generalised by taking into account this new notion of incompatibility when selecting the pair of
values to be separated. Therefore even if the attacker had the power to compute the coarsest partition of the
concrete states in the abstract failure state that separates bad states from dead states (which is a NP-hard
problem in the presence of irrelevant states) our strategy would force the partition to consist of trivial classes
only. In the running example, all we had to do was to apply ten more transformations of irrelevant states.
4.2. Best Obfuscation For The Running Example
We now apply the best code obfuscation strategy to our running example. Consider the abstract Kripke
structure in Fig. 4. The failure state s# = (x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}) covers all the
non-trivial partition classes for the variables of interest x and y. Since it is a failure state for an abstract
counterexample, we are in case (3). For simplicity, since the transformations for cases (1–2) are not needed,
we omit the insertion of the variable w.
The dead state s = (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2) is incompatible with the irrelevant state t = (x = 1, y = 1, pc = 2),
thus the triple (y, {1, 2}) is incompatible. For the same reason the value 0 for y is also separated from the
values 3, 4, 5. Our obfuscation must separate the values 1, 2 for x and the values 1, 3, 4, 5 for y. Therefore at
most 6 replicas are needed. In the end, 5 values for z suffices. Let us take the triple (x, {1, 2}) and let us pick
the two dead states t = (x = 2, y = 0, pc = 2) and s = (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2) in Fig. 5. The algorithm invokes
bad2dead(·) on state (t, z = 2) to make it incompatible with the dead state (x = 1, y = 0, pc = 2, z = 2). At
the code level, we note that all incoming transitions of t are due to the command c1 (see Fig. 5). To remove
them, c1 becomes c1,1.
pc in {1} /\ (z notin {2} \/ x notin {2} \/ y notin {2}) => pc=2, y=0 %c11
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(a) Before the deformation (as in Fig. 5) (b) After the deformation
Fig. 13. A detail of the abstract Kripke structure for z=2
Moreover, to make (t, z = 2) a bad state, is added a transition from the state (t, z = 2), to (x = 2, y =
2, pc = 2, z = 2) with the new command c1,2
pc in {1} /\ z in {3} /\ x in {1} /\ y in {1} => pc=3 %c12
In Fig. 13b we show the relevant changes on the Kripke structure for the replica with z = 2 (compare it with
Fig. 13a the corresponding detail of Fig. 5).
The other transformations needed consists of: (i) a bad-to-dead transformation for the triple (y, {1, 3})
(and z = 3) that also make incompatible the triples (y, {1, 4}) and (y, {1, 5}); (ii) an irrelevant-to-dead
transformation for the triple (y, {3, 4}) (and z = 4) that, as a side-effect, also make incompatible the triples
(y, {4, 5}); and (iii) an irrelevant-to-dead transformation for the triple (y, {3, 5}) (and z = 5).
All transformations are described below.
For (i), handling the triple (y, {1, 3}), let us consider the bad state t = (x = 1, y = 1, pc = 3) and the
irrelevant state s = (x = 1, y = 3, pc = 3) in Fig. 5. We apply a bad-to-dead transformation to the state
(t, z = 3) to make it incompatible with (s, z = 3). To remove the only outgoing transition from t (see Fig. 5)
we must change the guard of the command c3 to pc ∈ {3}∧ (z 6∈ {3}∨x 6∈ {1}∨ y 6∈ {1}). This produces the
command c3,1. Moreover, we need to make (t, z = 3) reachable, e.g., from s
′ = (x = 1, y = 1, pc = 1, z = 3).
Hence we add the command c1,2
pc in {1} /\ z in {3} /\ x in {1} /\ y in {1} => pc=3 %c12
pc in {3} /\ (z notin {3} \/ x notin {1} \/ y notin {1}) => pc=4, y=y+(2*x)-1 %c31
Note that as a side effect, the same transformation separates the values 1, 4 for y and also 1, 5 for y.
In Fig. 14b we show the relevant changes on the Kripke structure for the replica with z = 3 with respect to
the original Kripke structure depicted in Fig. 14a.
For (ii), handling the triple (y, {3, 4}), let us consider the irrelevant states t = (x = 1, y = 4, pc = 3) and
(x = 1, y = 3, pc = 3) in Fig. 5. We apply an irrelevant-to-dead transformation to the state (t, z = 4). Since
we need to make t reachable, we select, e.g., the state s′ = (x = 1, y = 4, pc = 1) and we add a transition
towards t. To this aim we add the command c1,3.
pc in {1} /\ z in {4} /\ x in {1} /\ y in {4} => pc=3 %c13
Note that, as a side effect, the same transformation separates the values 4, 5 for y. In Fig. 15b we show
the relevant changes on the Kripke structure for the replica with z = 4 with respect to the original Kripke
structure of Fig. 15a.
Finally (iii), it remains to deal with the triple (y, {3, 5}). To this aim, let us consider the irrelevant states
t = (x = 2, y = 5, pc = 4) and s = (x = 2, y = 3, pc = 4) in Fig. 5. We apply an irrelevant-to-dead
transformation to the state (t, z = 5). To make t reachable, we select, e.g., the state s′ = (x = 2, y = 5, pc = 1)
and we add a transition towards t. To this aim we add the command c1,4.
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(a) Before the deformation (as in Fig. 5) (b) After the deformation
Fig. 14. A detail of the abstract Kripke structure for z=3
(a) Before the deformation (as in Fig. 5) (b) After the deformation
Fig. 15. A detail of the abstract Kripke structure for z=4
pc in {1} /\ z in {5} /\ x in {2} /\ y in {5} => pc=4 %c14
As result of the obfuscation we obtain the program po = Oφ(p) below:
def x in {0,1,2} , y in {0,1,2,3,4,5} , pc in {1,2,3,4,5} , z in {1,2,3,4,5};
init pc = 1;
do pc in {1} /\ (z notin {2} \/ x notin {2} \/ y notin {2}) => pc=2, y=0 %c11
[] pc in {1} /\ z in {3} /\ x in {1} /\ y in {1} => pc=3 %c12
[] pc in {1} /\ z in {4} /\ x in {1} /\ y in {4} => pc=3 %c13
[] pc in {1} /\ z in {5} /\ x in {2} /\ y in {5} => pc=4 %c14
[] pc in {2} /\ x notin {0} => pc=3 %c2a
[] pc in {2} /\ x in {0} => pc=5 %c2b
[] pc in {2} /\ x in {2}} /\ y in {0} /\ z in {2} => y=2 %c21
[] pc in {3} /\ (z notin {3} \/ x notin {1} \/ y notin {1}) => pc=4, y=y+(2*x)-1 %c31
[] pc in {4} => pc=2, x=x-1 %c4
od
Let us assume that the attacker starts with the abstraction of the obfuscated program induced by the
partition x : {{0}, {1, 2}}, y : {{2}, {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}}, pc : {{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5}}, and z : {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. The abstract
Kripke structure is isomorphic to the one in Fig. 4 having several spurious counterexamples for φ. One such
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Fig. 16. Kripke structure of the obfuscated program after the first refinement
path is similar to the one in Fig. 4: {s#0 , s#1 , s#2 } with:
s#0 = x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈ {1}, z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
s#1 = x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, pc ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
s#2 = x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {2}, pc ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The failure state is s#1 . It has 5 bad concrete states and 12 dead states. By CEGAR we get the partition
x : {{0}, {1}, {2}} y : {{0}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}} pc : {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}}
z : {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}}
that has only trivial (singletons) classes. Therefore the abstract Kripke structure coincides with the concrete
Kripke structure: it has 450 states of which 90 are initial states. Its states are depicted in Fig. 16 where the
90 initial states are marked with thicker lines.
Given that the variables of interest are x and y, the measure of the obfuscation is 18, i.e., it has the maximum
value and thus po ≥{x,y}φ p ≥{x,y}φ p′. We remark that when z = 1, po has the same semantics as p and p′.
The guarded command po can be understood as a low-level, flattened description for programs written in any
language. In general, the same low-level description can correspond to many different high-level programs.
However, it is not difficult to derive, e.g., an ordinary imperative program from a given guarded command.
We do so for the reader’s convenience.
1: z = opaque1(x, y, z);
2: pc1: if ( ( z!=2 || x!=2 || y!=2 ) && opaque2(x, y, z) ) { y=0; goto pc2; }
3: else if ( z==3 && x==1 && y==1 ) goto pc3;
4: else if ( z==4 && x==1 && y==4 ) goto pc3;
5: else if ( z==5 && x==2 && y==5 ) goto pc4;
6: pc2: if ( z==2 && x==2 && y==0 && opaque3(x, y, z) ) y=2;
7: while ( x > 0 ) {
8: pc3: if ( z!=3 || x!=1 || y!=1 ) y = y + 2*x - 1;
9: pc4: x = x - 1;
10: pc5: } output(y);
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To hide the real value of z we initialise the variable using an opaque expression opaque1(x, y, z) whose value
is 1. Moreover, one has to pay attention to the possible sources of nondeterminism, which can arise when
there are two or more guarded commands g1 ⇒ a1 and g2 ⇒ a2 and a state s such that both g1 and g2
hold in s. The idea is to introduce opaque predicates in the program so that the exact conditions under
which a branch is taken are hard to determine by the attacker, who has to take into account both possibility
(true and false) as a nondeterministic choice. In our example, the sources of nondeterminism are due to
the pair of commands (c1,1, c1,2), (c1,1, c1,3), (c1,1, c1,4) and (c2,1, c2a). Consequently, we assume two opaque
predicates opaque2(x, y, z) and opaque3(x, y, z) are available. In order to preserve the semantics, for z = 1
we require that opaque1(x, y, z) returns true, while for opaque2(x, y, z) there is no restriction. Finally, since
the program counter is an explicit variable in guarded commands, we represent its possible values by labels
and use goto instructions accordingly. Thus we write the label pcn to denote states where pc = n and write
goto pcn for assignments of the form pc = n. Below is the imperative program we were able to derive from
the guarded command po.
5. Obfuscating Some Flow Analyses
Data flow analyses can be useful to eliminate dead-code and to determine variables that will be bound
to constant values at certain program points. An attacker can therefore use data flow techniques to infer
program properties that enhance his/her understanding of the program behaviour for a successful reverse
engineering and deobfuscation.
In [28, 29] it is shown that data flow analysis can be equivalently expressed in terms of model checking, in
the sense that the set of states satisfying a set of data-flow equations is the one that satisfies a correspond-
ing modal/temporal logic specification. In this section we exploit such a correspondence to show that our
obfuscation method can be used to prevent attacks aimed at disclosing data flow properties.
To this aim, we point out that our approach can be extended to address program models where transitions
are labelled. Simple transition annotations such as use and mod (indexed by a variable x, an expression e or
a definition d) can be used to address data flow properties in program models using modal/temporal logic
formulas. They refer, in order, to the fact that the variable x, an expression e, or a definition d has been used
in performing the transition or that its value has been modified. At the level of temporal logic we consider
parameterised operators w.r.t. transition labels: for A a set of labels, we write GAφ to mean that φ is valid
in all states reachable using transitions whose labels are in A, and [A]φ to mean that φ is valid in all states
reachable by any transition whose label is in A.
Below we give some examples of well-studied data flow properties as expressed in ∀CTL*:
• Constant propagation: this property refers to the fact that the value of a given expression e does not
change in the rest of the computation. This information can be useful in dead code elimination and
therefore to reduce the complexity of program analysis by deleting part of the program model, e.g., by




it is satisfied by those states where for any path and for any state along the path there is no outgoing
transition that modifies the value of e.
• Available expression: this flow analysis aims at detecting if an expression e is available at program point
p, i.e. the value of e has not changed since the last time e was computed on the paths to p. The logic





it is satisfied by those states where for any path and for any state in the path that is reachable via
transitions that do not use the value of e, there is no transition that modifies the value of e.
• Dead variable: a variable x is dead if its current value is never used. This information can be useful to
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it is satisfied by those states where for any path and for any state in the path that is reachable via
transitions that do not modify the value of x, there is no transition using the value of x.
• Very busy expression: this property is a stronger variant than liveness. It means that whenever the
expression e is modified it is not possible to reach a state where it is modified again unless it is used first.




it is satisfied by those states where for any path, for any state in the path and for any outgoing transition
that modifies the value of e we only reach states where the expression e is available (in the sense explained
earlier).
As a concrete example, let us investigate the property VBE(x) for the program already discussed in the
Introduction (taken from [29])
1: while (even(x)) {
2: x = x div 2;
3: } y = 2;
and, for simplicity, consider a very small domain for x, say {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Using the syntax of guarded
commands, the program becomes written as below.
def x in {0,1,2,3,4} , y in { 2 } , pc in {1,2,3,4};
init pc = 1;
do pc in {1} /\ even(x) => pc=2
[] pc in {1} /\ odd(x) => pc=3
[] pc in {2} => x=x div 2, pc=1
[] pc in {3} => y=2, pc=4
od
In order to disclose the property of VBE(x) an attacker can try to model check an abstract model of the
program against the above formula. Using CEGAR, the attacker would start from an abstract model where
the domain of x is partitioned in two classes: even values and odd values, and would easily prove that x is a
very busy expression. Indeed, in this case, there are no counterexamples to the required property. This can
be readily verified by looking at the abstract Kripke structure in Figure 17a.
The application of our best obfuscation strategy leads to the introduction of two spurious counterexamples,
according to case (2), with the addition of a variable w ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The corresponding abstract Kripke
structure is in Figure 17b, where the two spurious counterexample are evident by observing the newly added
self-loops with labels use followed by mod. Then a variable z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is used to separate all values that
x can take in the failure states. Omitting the details, we get the obfuscated program:
def x in {0,1,2,3,4}, y in {2}, pc in {1,2,3,4}, w in {1,2,3}, z in {1,2,3,4};
init pc = 1;
// original commands are preserved
do pc in {1} /\ even(x) => pc=2
[] pc in {1} /\ odd(x) => pc=3
[] pc in {2} => x=x div 2, pc=1
[] pc in {3} => y=2, pc=4
// two new commands to introduce spurious counterexamples
[] w in {2} /\ pc in {3} /\ x in {0} => x=2, y=2, pc=4
[] w in {3} /\ pc in {2} /\ x in {1} => x=3, pc=4
// one new command to split (x,2,4)
[] z in {2} /\ pc in {1} /\ x in {2} => pc=3
// one new command to split (x,1,3)
[] z in {3} /\ pc in {1} /\ x in {3} => pc=2
// one new command to split (x,0,4)
[] z in {4} /\ pc in {1} /\ x in {2,4} => pc=3
od






















(b) After the introduction of spurious counterexamples (applica-
tion of case (2) of the obfuscation strategy)
Fig. 17. Abstract Kripke structures
Now, applying CEGAR to the obfuscated program, the property is proved to hold only after having parti-
tioned the domain of x in trivial (singleton) classes.
As before, we can give an imperative program that corresponds to the obfuscated code.
1: w = opaque1(x,w, z);
2: z = opaque2(x,w, z);
3: pc1: if ( x==2 && z==2 && opaque3(x,w, z) ) goto pc3;
4: else if ( x==3 && z==3 && opaque4(x,w, z) ) goto pc2;
5: else if ( (x==2 || x==3) && z==4 && opaque5(x,w, z) ) goto pc3;
6: while (even(x)) {
7: pc2: if ( x==1 && w==3 && opaque6(x,w, z) ) { x=3; goto pc4; }
8: x = x div 2;
9: pc3: } if ( x==0 && w==2 && opaque7(x,w, z) ) { x=2; y=2; goto pc4; }
10: y = 2;
11: pc4: skip;
Of course the value returned by opaque expressions opaque1(x,w, z) and opaque2(x,w, z) must be 1. Since
all opaque predicates are in conjunction with values different than 1 for w and z, the semantics of the original
program is preserved independently of the results returned by opaque predicates.
6. Discussion
We have shown that it is possible to systematically transform Kripke structures in order to make automated
abstraction refinement by CEGAR hard. Addressing refinement procedures instead of specific abstractions
makes our approach independent from the chosen abstraction in the attack.
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To enforce the protection of the real values of variable w (and analogously for z) initialised by opaque
functions against more powerful attacks able to inspect the memory of different program runs, one idea is
to use a class of values instead of a single value. This allows the obfuscated code to introduce instructions
that assign to w different values in the same class, thus convincing the attacker that the value of w is not
invariant.
The complexity of our best code obfuscation strategy is polynomial in the size of the domains of the variables
of interest. Moreover, we note that the same algorithm can produce a valuable obfuscation even if one selects
a partial cover instead of a complete one: in this case, it is still guaranteed that the refinement strategy
will be forced to split all the values appearing in the partial cover. This allows to choose the right trade-off
between the complexity of the obfuscation strategy and the measure of the obfuscated program. It is also
possible that the algorithm introduces more transformations than strictly necessary. This is because the
obfuscation is performed w.r.t. an initial partition. To further reduce the number of transformations, we can
apply the obfuscation only at the end of the abstract model checking process, where less pairs of values needs
to be separated. Of course, this strategy would not influence the measure of the result.
As already mentioned, our obfuscation assumes that CEGAR makes dead states incompatible with both
irrelevant and bad states. Our algorithm can be generalised to the more general setting where dead states
are only incompatible with bad states. Therefore even if the attacker had the power to compute the coarsest
partition that separates bad states from dead states (which is a NP-hard problem) our strategy would force
the partition to consist of trivial classes only.
We can see abstraction refinement as a learning procedure which learns the coarsest state equivalence by
model checking a temporal formula. Our results provide a very first attempt to defeat this procedure.
It remains to be investigated how big the text of the best obfuscated program can grow: limiting its size is
especially important in the case of embedded systems.
We plan to extend our approach to other abstraction refinements, like predicate refinement and the com-
pleteness refinement in [19] for generic abstract interpreters and more in general for a machine learning
algorithm. This would make automated reverse engineering hard in more general attack models.
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